Not so long ago, in the late 20 th century, philosophers of mind generally assumed that we have some sort of privileged access to, or at any rate some special authority in speaking about, our own mental states. Most did not assume that this privilege extends to every aspect of our mental lives, but most did assume that we are at least in a specially favorable position to know our own thoughts and feelings, on the one hand, and our own standing attitudes such as belief, desire, and intention, on the other. Moreover, late twentieth century philosophers typically assumed that this privilege reflects some difference of principle in the way we can gain knowledge of these topics. The problem was to explain this difference of principle.
The larger aim of Self--Knowledge for Humans, however, is not merely to defend such inferentialism. As his title indicates, Cassam thinks mainstream work on self--knowledge fails to offer an account of self--knowledge 'for humans'. The sort of humanity Cassam has in mind is not the sort that elevates us above the beasts, but the kind evoked by the phrase 'only human', as in the Human League's chart--topping single of 1986:
I'm only human Of flesh and blood I'm made Human Born to make mistakes Humans in this sense stand opposed to Vulcans, that remarkable race of alien beings whose rationality is never hampered by haste, emotion, fatigue, or self--deceit. That we homo sapiens are not such beings is widely recognized -the Human League were aware of it, and it is a crucial premise of Star Trek -but Cassam points out that our anecdotal evidence for this conclusion has been powerfully reinforced in the recent decades by rigorous studies of human reasoning and decision--making. 4 We are, it turns out, systematically liable to form beliefs and make choices, not on the basis of rationally defensible principles, but by employing simplifying 'heuristics' which get us to the optimal outcome in some cases, but lead us astray in others. Moreover, we typically do not recognize the role that such heuristics play in our thinking, and often are disposed to give demonstrably confabulated accounts of our reasons for believing or choosing as we do. All this is certainly discouraging news, but who should be surprised by it? According to Cassam, it should come as a surprise to a group of philosophers he calls 'Rationalists about self--knowledge', whose core idea is that we can know our own minds by employing the 'Transparency Method', which tells us that we can determine our own attitude toward a given proposition p by considering some corresponding first--order question about p itself. Cassam argues that philosophers who think this strategy can provide a general account of how we know our own attitudes are committed to supposing that, in general, our attitudes are as they rationally ought to be. If this is right, then the evidence that humans are only imperfectly rational constitutes prima facie evidence that the Rationalist theory of self--knowledge does not apply to humans, but to some other superhuman sort of creature. Cassam calls this other sort of creature 'homo philosophicus', by analogy with the idealized 'homo economicus' of classical economic theory. I will simply call them 'Vulcans'.
humanity in theorizing about self--knowledge, but he thinks this charge applies in a broader sense to much mainstream discussion of the topic. In general, he holds that philosophers have exaggerated both the extent to which we have privileged knowledge of our own minds and the immediacy with which we have this knowledge when we do. Indeed, he suggests that mainstream philosophical work on self--knowledge has lost touch with the human interest of the topic. When ordinary people hear the term 'self--knowledge', they think of knowledge whose acquisition would be a substantial achievement: knowledge of my true character, for instance, or of which of my professed values I genuinely hold. Philosophers, by contrast, tend to focus on varieties of self--knowledge whose triviality would astonish ordinary people: knowledge of whether I believe it is raining, for instance, and knowledge of whether I presently feel toothache. Why do philosophers engage in scholastic disputes about such matters when there are real and significant questions that beg to be addressed? This, in effect, is Cassam's challenge to mainstream philosophical work on self--knowledge. I think this is a valuable challenge: it is striking that so much philosophical discussion is devoted to relatively trivial self--knowledge. What justifies this focus? I hope to say something about this, but in order to do so, it will be necessary first to address some misrepresentations in
Cassam's presentation of the transparency approach and to raise some doubts about whether we can be satisfied with Cassam's inferentialism. These tasks will occupy me in the next two sections. In the final section, I will return to the question of the philosophical (and human) interest of 'trivial' self--knowledge.
Transparency and Vulcanism
Cassam's book is cast as a rebuke to mainstream philosophical theorizing about self--knowledge as a whole, but it is particularly addressed to approaches that emphasize the 'transparency' of questions about our own attitudes to questions about the world toward which our attitudes are directed. These approaches, which have loomed large in recent discussion, take their departure from the observation that, in various cases, there is a correlation between how I would answer some world--directed question and how I should answer some question about my own attitude.
Given this correlation, they argue, I can answer the question whether I hold a given attitude by treating it as 'transparent' to a corresponding world--directed question. 104--6). Finally, he suggests that, even where it is possible to know one's own attitudes by TM, this is itself a case of inference, mediated by the premise that one's attitude on a given topic is as it rationally ought to be (6, 111--12, 117--18) . All of these objections rest, however, on the cogency of Cassam's case for attributing to transparency theorists a commitment to supposing that our attitudes are as they rationally ought to be. I think the case is flawed at several points. Cassam's book might give one the impression that Finkelstein is an advocate of this approach, but in fact he is a critic aiming to make it out to be silly. It would indeed be silly to propose that, in general, I can know whether I hold some attitude A by considering whether I ought rationally to hold A, but this is simply not the view of Moran or other major advocates of this approach. 6
In the case of belief, as we have seen, the world--directed question to which the question about whether I believe that p is transparent can be stated without any mention of rationality: it is simply the question whether p. To generalize the approach, it would be necessary to identify world--directed questions corresponding to other attitudes, and there has been a good deal of work on this, which Cassam does not review. Evans suggests, for instance, that whether it visually appears to me that p is correlated with whether p would figure in my answer to the question how things are directly in front of me, when I constrain my answer in certain specifiable ways (Evans 1982: 227--8) . Alex Byrne (2011) 
has argued that whether I intend to do
A is correlated with my answer to the question whether I will do A, when I answer the latter question only on a certain sort of basis. Characterizing the relevant world--directed questions is not a simple task -not significantly simpler than, and closely related to, the task of giving a philosophical analysis of the relevant attitudes. But the idea that such characterizations can in principle be given is no less plausible than the idea that, to each type of attitude, there corresponds a characteristic stance on some question about the non--mental world. matter that the stance on p expressed in judgment may for the most part coincide with the stance embodied in belief. The point is that, even when the judging subject has settled on an answer to the question whether p, there is still (in principle) another question for her to settle, namely whether she actually believes that p. Many contemporary philosophers are committed to this sort of picture of the epistemic relation between judgment and belief, but I think on reflection it should strike us as strange.
Focusing on a case in which the subject judges out loud may help to bring out its strangeness. 12
Let the subject consider whether p and express her conclusion aloud:
Now let her infer her own belief from this 'external prompting', and again express her conclusion aloud: (2) I believe that p.
Assuming the subject is not alienated from her own belief, we would ordinarily take (2), like (1), to express belief that p. On the inferentialist analysis, however, this cannot be right. Whereas
(1) may express belief that p, (2) relates to this belief only indirectly: it merely expresses the subject's belief that she believes that p, which is based on evidence that she believes that p, but is not itself an unmediated expression of her first--order belief. So her assertion of (2) expresses, not an endorsement of p as true, but a (no doubt very well founded) hypothesis about herself.
If she were fully clear about her own epistemic situation, she really ought to say to herself: 'Yes, p, and so it is extremely likely that I believe that p, since my beliefs coincide with my judgment in most cases, and I've no reason to think this is an exception.' If I received this sort of report on someone's beliefs, I should demand to speak to the believer herself, not just to her biographer, however well--informed she might be. The uncanniness of the inferentialist analysis is even more palpable in the case of other attitudes. Consider hope. Suppose the subject notices inner promptings (whatever these might be) that she takes to reflect a hope that X will come with her on a picnic. Let her infer that she hopes X will come and express her conclusion by saying to X (3) I hope you'll come.
If (3) is offered as a report on an inference, I think X should find it rather disappointing. 'I hope you'll come' is normally heard as welcoming because it is taken to express hope itself, not just belief, however certain, in the existence of hope.
13
Even if the subject adds: 'And I (qua judger) wholly endorse and identify with this attitude', her remark is still missing its marrow: the hope itself is elsewhere, and we are merely looking on. Parallel points could be made about other attitudes. To treat all attitudinal self--knowledge as inferential is to build alienation into the very structure of such knowledge. Indeed, even in the case described by Lawlor, I think inferentialism gives an unnatural account of the situation. A person can certainly realize that she wants another child by paying attention to her own thoughts and feelings in the way Lawlor describes, but is it really plausible to represent this as a matter of detecting some standing fact of the matter? Her feelings when she boxes up outgrown clothes and receives news of her friend's pregnancy are certainly indications of an incipient desire, but 'incipient' is important here. It is natural to imagine her also thinking of ways in which having another child would make it difficult to pursue other things she cares about. What she wants to know, presumably, is whether the decision to have another child is one she can genuinely embrace, and though 'inner promptings' may serve as indications of such a readiness, this is not simply a question of discovering what is already so but of reaching a settled attitude on the matter. of it to be unreliable. In the face of this, how can we justify focusing exclusively on cases of easy attitudinal self--knowledge? I think our observations about transparency and alienation provide the basis for an answer this challenge, but let me emphasize that I will not try to justify inattention to the kinds of self--knowledge that are hard to achieve. I agree that it is worth understanding what difficulties stand in the way of substantial self--knowledge, and how such knowledge matters to a good life. It is, I think, not easy to frame questions about these topics that philosophers are well--equipped to address, and perhaps this accounts for the relative paucity of attention they have received. But I certainly do not want to defend this neglect, just to defend the interest of the topic that philosophers have more commonly discussed under the heading of 'self--knowledge'. Cassam anticipates that, if philosophers are asked to justify their focus on easy self--knowledge, they will respond that this knowledge is epistemologically distinctive in a way that matters to philosophy, even if it matters little to humanity at large (43ff.). This may well be the most common response to such a challenge, but if so, I think the majority opinion does not reflect the best reasons for interest in this topic. A more compelling answer is implicit in Sydney
Shoemaker's remark that it is essential to a philosophical understanding of the mental that we appreciate that there is a first person perspective on it, a distinctive way mental states present themselves to the subjects whose states they are, and that an essential part of the philosophical task is to give an account of mind which makes intelligible the perspective mental subjects have on their own mental lives. (Shoemaker 1996: 157) In recent decades, philosophers interested in the 'distinctive way mental states present themselves to the subjects whose states they are' have mainly focused on the 'phenomenal' aspect of conscious mentality, but I take Shoemaker to hold that the special way in which we are aware of our own attitudes is another crucial aspect what he calls 'the first person perspective' on mind. 15 His claim is that an understanding of this perspective is essential to an adequate understanding of the mind itself. I cannot defend this claim here; there is only time to express sympathy for it, and to suggest that it would provide a powerful rationale for interest in the awareness we have of (certain of) our mental states in virtue of being the subject of those states. Note that this rationale addresses us, not primarily as epistemologists, but as philosophers of mind: the idea is that, to understand the mind, we must understand subjectivity, and subjectivity is expressed primarily in a special mode of awareness of certain states: awareness of them from a special standpoint one has precisely in virtue of being in those states. 16 Our observations in the foregoing sections should begin to give us some grip on how this idea might apply to attitudinal self--knowledge. We have seen that the capacity of a subject to answer a question about her own attitude on some topic by treating it as 'transparent' to a question about the world reflects a special kind of participant's standpoint on that attitude, a standpoint that contrasts with an alienated standpoint in which the subject merely knows of the attitude as a fact about herself. I believe understanding knowledge of an attitude from a participant's standpoint, and how it differs from mere cognizance (as we can call it), is crucial to understanding what it is for reflective creatures like us to have a standpoint on the world; and this is surely a core element of the concept of mind, whatever else may be contained in it.
To assert this sort of essential connection between mentality and subjectivity is not to imply that a subject will always know her own mind, any more than the essential connection between, say, the heart and the circulation of the blood ensures that the heart will always
